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:DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE RULE
OF LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE CONSEIL D'ETAT
GEORGE D. BROWN*
Americans tend to regard France as a somewhat despotic country
where drivers' licenses are summarily revoked by roadside tribunals,
political opponents are treated badly, and in general the rule of law is
lightly regarded.' From time to time disgruntled Frenchmen come
forward to reinforce this picture.2 Against such a background of illiber-
alism, the lack of judicial review of legislation in France does not seem
surprising. And it has become a commonplace to present the French
hostility to judicial review as a polar example of attitudes toward this
institution.3 Yet there are ample signs that this generalization needs to
be reexamined. To begin with, influential French jurists have long
advocated judicial review. Second, the institutions of the Fourth and
Fifth Republics show a slight shift in its direction. Third, some of the
political left's traditional hostility to judicial review may have softened.
Fourth, and most importantly, the Conseil d'Etat, the supreme admin-
istrative court, has demonstrated the value of an independent judicial
body in protecting citizens from arbitrary governmental actions. Indeed,
under the Fifth Republic, the Conseil d'Etat has been exercising a kind
of judicial review. This article will first examine the current status of
judicial review in France and will then focus on the recent work of the
Conseil d'Etat as a possible source of future developments.
FRENCH VIEWS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Since the Revolution, the French courts have steadfastly refused to
consider constitutional objections to laws passed by Parliament.4 French
jurists, however, have not been unanimous in defending this practice. In
fact, the debate over judicial review has "polarized" French legal thought
since the end of the nineteenth century.5 Major figures in French public
law such as Hauriou and Duguit have advocated review.6 Currently,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston University; LL.B., Harvard, 1965.
1 E.g., Private War of Prefect Bruneau, Time, Aug. 19, 1966, p. 30.
2 E.g., Mitterand, France is no longer a Democracy, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1966
(Magazine), p. 14; Revel, The French (1966).
8 E.g., Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Ante-
cedents and Adaptations, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1212, 1219 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Cappelletti & Adams].
4 E.g., Arrighi, Conseil d'Etat, Nov. 6, 1936, [1938] D. III. 1, [1937] S. III. 33,
translated in von Mehren, The Civil Law System 181 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
von Mehren].
5 Batailler, Le Conseil d'Etat, juge constitutionnel 9 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Batailler].
6 Von Mehren 168-69.
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the opinion, of legal writers (la doctrine) seems generally favorable
to it.7
The historical background of the traditional attitude is well-known:
the Revolution's hostility toward the Parlements of the Ancien Rggime.8
These exceedingly powerful courts exercised a form of judicial review
of the royal edicts9 and maintained an obstructive supervision over the
administration.'0 The leaders of the Revolution were opposed to any
control over popular assemblies, and particularly hostile to the judiciary's
social class, the Noblesse de Robe. Thus the Parlements were abolished,
and the Constitution of 1791 forbade judges to interfere with the exercise
of legislative power or to suspend the execution of laws.1' Modern
French Constitutions have not expressly forbidden judicial review of
laws, but the fundamental codes carry on the Revolutionary tradition of
the subordination of the courts to Parliament.1 2
There is no longer such active opposition to the judiciary as a class.' 3
However, civil law concepts of the role of the judge, themselves a
product of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic attitudes, undoubtedly
militate against judicial review. 14 The judge's function is regarded
essentially as one of applying the law, working within the guidelines
laid down by the Code. Although modern civil law thinking has recog-
nized the important, and often independent role that the judge does in
fact play,15 he is still regarded as a subordinate in the law-making
process.
The major reason for the non adoption of judicial review lies in the
dominant concept of French republican theory: the supremacy of Par-
liament as the voice of the "general will."'16 "National sovereignty be-
longs to the people who exercise it through their representatives .... ,,17
Parliament was the only organ elected by universal suffrage until 1962
when this also became the method for choosing the President. Thus
Parliament was the sole expression of the general will, and its acts
could not be controlled by any other body. The French describe this
tradition as one of separation of powers, but it differs from the American
7 Batailler 17.
s David & de Vries, The French Legal System 30 (1958).
9 Cappelletti & Adams 1210.
1o Waline, Droit administratif 24-25 (9th ed. 1963).
11 Constitution of 1791, title VII, arts. 202-03.
12 E.g., Code Civil arts. 4, 5 (65th ed. Dalloz 1966).
1. But see p. 465 infra.
14 Drago, General Comparative View of the French Constitution, 21 Ohio St.
L.J. 535, 546 (1960).
15 See von Mehren, Book Review, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 370-71 (1949); Carbonnier,
Droit civil 17-18 (6th ed. 1965).
16 Drago, supra note 14, at 546.
17 Constitution of 1958, art. 3.
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notion of that term as comprising checks and balances.18 Furthermore,
the French concept is essentially hierarchical ;19 in any conflict the legis-
lature must prevail, even if, for example, it invades the province of the
judiciary.
This tenet of the inviolability of the legislature's will has led to a
certain dilemma about the place of the Constitution. If the legislature can
do anything it wants, it can pass a law inconsistent with the Constitution.
Yet this document supposedly occupies a predominant place in the
hierarchy of laws. Carr6 de Malberg, the leading defender of legislative
supremacy, solved the dilemma by denying that the Constitution was
superior to the law.20 Both are expressions of the general will, the law
being the most recent. As one critic summarized Carr6 de Malberg's
position, "the Constitution becomes one law among others, first in age,
but without superiority over the others."' 21 Of course, it is not necessary
to go this far. Many French republicans have recognized the supremacy
of the Constitution and have hoped that the legislature would not violate
it.22 They have concluded, however, that the only solution is to leave
the legislature as the sole judge of its acts.
If laws are to be reviewed to determine their "constitutionality," the
Constitution must furnish some applicable standards. French Constitu-
tions have primarily been descriptions of the structure of government 2
and have lacked broad clauses of the "due process" type which provide
bases for the development of standards. The Constitution of the Third
Republic "omitted any reference to protection of civil liberties .... -24
The Constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics do invoke the
"Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens" :in their preambles.
And the Fourth Republic's preamble announces other general principles
which are reaffirmed in the current preamble.25 However, French jurists
have been reluctant to consider the preamble as of equal force with the
rest of the Constitution. 26 "In contrast to the guarantees of individual
rights set forth in the Federal and State Constitutions in the United
States, directly applied and construed by the courts as law, the Preamble
of the French Constitution is essentially a statement of political aspira-
18 Cappelletti & Adams 1211-12.
19 Batailler 165.
20 See La loi, expression de la volont6 ggnrale (1931).
21 Batailler 164.
22 See Burdeau, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques 106 (1965).
23 Batailler 90.
24 David & de Vries, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62.
25 "The French people solemnly proclaims its attachment to the rights of man
and to the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789,
confirmed and completed by the preamble of the Constitution of 1946." Constitution
of 1958, Preamble.
26 See Chaus, De la soumission au droit des r~glements autonomes, [1960] D.
Chron. 119, 120-22.
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tion, an acknowledgment of the existence of fundamental individual
rights, and an outline of a program to be rendered effective by legislative
action."'27 It has been questioned whether the French Constitution could
be regarded as the expression of a "common ethical standard," in view
of the lack of an underlying nationa'l consensus.28 (The existence of
such a consensus has perhaps been an important factor in the acceptance
of judicial review in the United States.) 29 Rather there has been a
tendency to view it as "a symbol of the political regime, a document
identifying the nature and political organization of Empire, or Monarchy,
or Republic."80
The above are the principal causes of the tradition's duration through
the present day. Several other factors are worthy of mention. Many
Frenchmen have invoked the example of the United States Supreme
Court during the period when it invalidated liberal legislation.8 ' During
the 1946 constitutional debates, one influential politician reminded his
colleagues that "the American experience with the Supreme Court has
proved that it is dangerous to entrust the judiciary with the control of
the constitutionality. Such a 'government by the judges' enhances the
powers of the reactionary forces and slows down any evolution toward
progress."32 Increased awareness of the Supreme Court's recent work38
may tend to mute this objection. However, many Frenchmen feel that
the Supreme Court's main function is to "umpire" the federal system.
Judicial review is seen as less important in a unitary country such as
France.34 Finally there is the argument that, since the Fourth and Fifth
Republic Constitutions provide for limited review of constitutionality
by a special body, there is an implicit ban on any review by the courts. 85
Those who favor judicial review base their arguments on the su-
premacy of the Constitution as the highest law in the state. This concept
can be traced back to French legal thinkers of the sixteenth century.386
For the advocates of judicial review the Constitution is not a "mere
political program," but the highest law within the hierarchy of laws.87
27 David & de Vries, op. cit. supra note 8, at 61.
28 Grosser, The Evolution of European Parliaments, Daedalus, Winter 1964, p.
153, 156.
29 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 9-10 (1955).
30 David & de Vries, op. cit. supra note 8, at 61-62.
31 E.g., Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la lgislation
sociale aux Etats-Unis (1921).
32 Constitutional Committee of the Second Constituent Assembly, session of
July 11, 1946, remarks of the chairman (Andr6 Philip), in von Mehren 162.
33 E.g., Tune & Tune, Le droit des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, sources et tech-
niques (1955).
84 Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 22, at 99-100; Tune, The Fifth Republic, The
Legislative Power, and Constitutional Review, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 335 (1960).
35 Batailler 30-32. The work of these bodies is described at pp. 467-69 infra.
36 Cappelletti & Adams 1210.
87 Batailler 12.
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The will of the people acting as the constituent power is viewed as
superior to the will of the people acting through their elected repre-
sentatives in the making of normal laws. s8 The fact that the Constitution,
particularly today, is enacted and amended by a special procedure lends
support to this argument.3 9
The Constitution thus becomes the cornerstone of la l~galit9, the rule
of law. And individuals need protection from violations of la lgalitg
by the legislature as well as by the executive.40 Furthermore, the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers is not violated.
Neither the legislature nor the judiciary can do any act that would
be contrary to the decision of the constituent power. If the legisla-
tive power violates a constitutional rule, it cannot impose upon the
judicial powers the obligation of joining in this violation. The latter
remains sovereign and independent in its own field, and cannot be
compelled by the legislative power to violate the constitutional law.41
Those who insist that judges should not apply unconstitutional laws
have encountered the problem of what the source of' "constitutionality"
should be. They maintain that the courts can find applicable standards
in the Preamble and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.42 This ap-
proach would inevitably lead to a creative and independent role for the
judiciary, such as the Conseil d'Etat has played in developing "general
principles of law." 48 Yet some of the advocates of judicial review seem
unwilling to admit this. They describe the judge's role as the mere
"confrontation" of two rules to see if they are consistent. 44
The parties of the left have traditionally been hostile to judicial
review.45 Yet their experience under the De Gaulle regime has led many
liberals to conclude that judicial guarantees against arbitrary government
action are necessary. In July 1966, the Federation of the Democratic and
Socialist Left, whose candidate received forty-five per cent of the vote
in the 1965 presidential election, issued its platform (Programme) for
the 1967 legislative elections. Article two, section one declares:
The battle of the left has always been the battle for liberty. The
defense of liberty is first of all the assurance of the respect for law
against arbitrary action by the state itself. The creation of a Con-
88 3 Duguit, Trait6 de droit constitutionnel 668-69 (2d ed. 1923), quoted in von
Mehren 168.
39 Friedrich, The New French Constitution in Political and Historical Perspec-
tive, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 835 (1959).
40 Hauriou, Precis de droit constitutionnel 287-88 (2d ed. 1929), quoted in von
Mehren 168-69.
41 Duguit, op. cit. supra note 38, at 668-69.
42 Duverger, La Cinqui~me R~publique 172 (3d ed. 1963).
43 See text at notes 103-25 infra.
44 Batailler 10.
45 See the excerpts from the 1946 constitutional debates quoted in von Mehren
157-164.
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stitutional Supreme Court corresponds to this desire. This court,
placed at the summit of the judicial branch, and separate from the
executive, will have the mission of ensuring the constitutionality of
laws and the independence of the judiciary. The Court, composed
of nine judges, will have a wider jurisdiction, a greater authority,
and better guarantees of independence than the current Constitu-
tional Council which has not fulfilled the mission the Constitution
entrusted it with.4 6
The platform of M. Jean Lecanuet's center party also calls for the
creation of a Supreme Court.4 7
Dissatisfaction with the Fifth Republic's halfway approach to judicial
review-the Constitutional Council-is an important factor in this atti-
tude, and at this point it is necessary to examine briefly this institution
and its Fourth Republic predecessor.
THE HALFWAY APPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Frenchmen, said to be logical, have been troubled by the fact that
while the Constitution is supposed to be superior to ordinary laws, the
legislature need not observe it. Allowing the legislature to be the sole
judge of the constitutionality of its acts has seemed inadequate to many.
With the judiciary deemed unfit to exercise this control, there have
been numerous attempts to find someone else to exercise it.4 8 In 1946
there was serious consideration of submitting questions of constitution-
ality to the people via referendum, but this solution was not adopted.49
The most frequently suggested technique has been that of a semipolitical
body, separate from the assembly. Siiyes suggested a "constitutional
jury" along these lines as early as 1797.50 The concept reappears in the
Constitutional Senates (Sgnat Conservateur) of the nineteenth century.
These bodies are considered to have been "completely useless" as con-
stitutional guarantors.51 The Constitutional Committee (Comitg Consti-
tutionnel) of the Fourth Republic did not play an appreciable role either,
but it merits brief consideration as a step beyond the Third Republic's
solution of the assembly as sole judge of its acts.
The Comitg Constitutionnel is generally regarded as having been
"more political than judicial. 61 2 Its members were the President of the
46 Le Populaire de Paris, Aug. 25, 1966, p. 2, col. 3. A summary is printed in Le
Monde, July 17-18, 1966, p. 4.
47 Le Monde, July 17-18, 1966, p. 5, col. 2. In September the small but influential
Parti Socialiste Unifi6 announced its opposition to the creation of a Constitutional
Court on the ground that such a court would be a reactionary force. Le Monde,
Sept. 23, 1966, p. 6, col. 1.
48 Waline, The Constitutional Council of the French Republic, 12 Am. J. Comp.
L. 483 (1963).
49 Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 22, at 106.
50 Id. at 95.
51 Batailler 29.
52 Waline, supra note 48, at 484.
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Republic, the Presidents of the Assembly and of the Senate (Council
of the Republic), and seven members elected by the Assembly and three
elected by the Senate. The elected members were chosen each year from
outside Parliament.5" The Committee's task was to "examine whether
the laws voted by the National Assembly presuppose an amendment
of the Constitution. '54 If the Committee sent back the law, it presumably
could not be promulgated unless the amendment procedure, involving
both houses, was followed." In fact, its main function appeared to be
to conciliate between the two houses.56 The Committee only rendered
one decision, and that was in a matter of minor importance.
57
Its successor, the Conseil Constitutionnel figures prominently in the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic,58 and in the early days of the regime
it seemed likely to become one of the important organs of the state.59
This promise has not been fulfilled. The Council has not played a
major role as "guardian of the Constitution." 60 Instead, it has served
as guardian of the executive's prerogatives against encroachment by the
legislature and has also carried out its functions in a "political" rather
than a "judicial" manner.61
The Constitutional Council has nine regular members who serve nine
year terms. The President of the Republic and the Presidents of the
two houses each elect three. Former Presidents of the Republic are
members ex officio. The Council has many functions including the
supervision of presidential elections (article 50), the supervision of
referenda (article 60), and jurisdiction over disputed parliamentary
elections (article 59) .62 The Council's control over the constitutionality
of laws is spelled out principally in article 61. After a law has been
voted, and before its promulgation by the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister, the President himself, or the President of either house
of Parliament can ask the Council to rule on its conformity with the
Constitution. If none of these four objects to the law on constitutional
grounds, there is no way for anyone else to get a ruling. On the other
hand, certain laws must be passed on by the Council before taking effect.
These are Parliament's own rules (article 61), and the limited category
53 Ibid.; see Engel, Judicial Review and Political Preview of Legislation in Post-
war France, 6 Inter-American L. Rev. 53-57 (1964).
64 Constitution of 1946, art. 91.
55 Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 22, at 107.
56 Waline, supra note 48, at 484-85; see Constitution of 1946, art. 92.
57 Batailler 30.
58 Constitution of 1958, title VII.
59 Williams & Harrison, De Gaulle's Republic 134-35 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Williams & Harrison].
60 The phrase is Professor Tunc's, Tunc, supra note 34, at. 341.
61 Batailler 32-33, 45-53; see Drago, supra note 14, at 545-46.
62 For general descriptions of the Conseil Constitutionnel see Duverger, op. cit.
supra note 42, at 157-71; Engel, supra note 53, at 57-65; Waline, supra note 48.
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known as "organic law" (articles 46 and 61). These are mainly "laws
defining aspects of the organization or the relations of the public
powers. 'o8
Certainly the Council's functioning is far removed from American
notions of judicial review. It does not have the guarantees of impartiality
and independence associated with a true court. It acts only before a law
has gone into effect, and is in no way open to the individual citizen who
may be harmed by the law.6 4 In fact, the Council's main function has
been a relatively nonjudicial one. The 1958 Constitution breaks with
French republican tradition in restricting the legislature to a certain
sphere of action specifically delineated.65 All other matters belong to
the Government (cabinet) to regulate by decree. The Constitutional
Council's role has been to prevent the legislature from attempting to
enact laws outside its own sphere. 6 The Council itself recognized this
in 1962 when it invoked "the spirit of the Constitution which has created
in the Council an organ to regulate the activity of the public powers."
'6 T
In this "regulation" the Council has tended to limit the jurisdiction of
Parliament and to give the Government's decree power a'broad field
of action.68
Thus the "constitutionality" of a law is a question of whether it is
within the specifically defined legislative power. Whether Parliament
has violated the general principles invoked by the Preamble is irrelevant.
The Council has not extended its definition of constitutionality to include
these principles, and most observers conclude that it will not do so.69
The Council is not really a constitutional court at all. 70 It is, however,
a step beyond the Committee of the Fourth Republic. The fact that the
Council is criticized for not being enough of a constitutional court is
perhaps indicative of future developments. To some extent, France
already possesses such a court: the Conseil d'Etat.
THE CONSEIL D'ETAT
The Conseil d'Etat is the highest body within the French administra-
tion. It serves as both the administration's adviser and its judge. The
63 Waline, supra note 48, at 490.
64 Cappelletti & Adams 1212-13.
65 See p. 477 infra.
66 Waline, supra note 48, at 485.
67 Quoted in Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 22, at 110-11.
68 Chapsal, La Cinqui~me R~publique 76-77 (Les Cours de Droit 1962-63) - Ba-
tailler 45-53. But see Cohen, La jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel relative
au domaine de Ia loi d'apr~s l'article 34 de Ia Constitution, 1963 Revue de Droit
Public 745.
69 Batailler 44-45; Drago, supra note 14, at 547-48. Contra, Duverger,. op. cit.
supra note 42, at 173. M. Duverger bases his argument on the fact that the Fourth
Republic's Constitution forbade the Comit6 Constitutionnel to apply the preamble,
while the new Constitution contains no such restriction on the powers of the Conseil.
70 Cappelletti & Adams 1210-11. Contra, Waline, supra note 48, at 488.
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judicial section of the Conseil (the Section du Contentieux), is the
supreme court for administrative matters, and is probably the most
prestigious judicial body in France.7 1 The Conseil d'Etat was created
by Napoleon at the heart of his administrative structure to replace the
old Conseil du Roi. Since disputes involving the administration could
not be heard by the regular courts, one section of the Conseil soon devel-
oped into a separate court to hear these matters. 72 Until 1953 it had
been the main administrative court; in that year lower "administrative
tribunals" were established.78 The idea that the administration could
thus judge itself seemed to many critics, both French and English,74
inconsistent with the dictates of judicial impartiality. However, the
Section du Contentieux developed an attitude of complete independence,
and most French commentators feel the Conseil has been more effective
in protecting the rights of individual citizens than the regular courts
would have been.75 It is also noteworthy that the Conseil d'Etat's own
case law has been the dominant force in the development of administra-
tive law. Legislation has, of course, played a large role in this area, but
the Conseil's position is quite unlike that of the regular courts which
are, in theory at least, merely applying the provisions of the Codes.
Many excellent treatments of the Conseil and its work are available
in English,78 and a brief description will suffice here. In keeping with
its dual function the Conseil is divided into administrative sections and
the judicial section. The judicial section is divided into subsections, and
normal business is handled by two subsections sitting together. Important
cases come before larger bodies within the section.77 The relative separa-
tion between administrative and judicial sections and the consequent
development of a specialized tribunal have undoubtedly contributed to
the Conseil's strength. The 1963 reform of the Conseil reduced this
separation somewhat by increasing the interchanges between the two
parts. In particular, the Plenary Assembly, which sits on important
cases was effected; with an increased representation of the administra-
tion.78 Nonetheless, most commentators feel the 1963 reforms have not
71 Von Mehren, Book Review, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 698, 699 (1954).
72 Von Mehren 186-92.
78 Freedman, The Conseil d'Etat in Modern France 61-62 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Freedman] ; Brewster, The Reorganization of the French Administrative
Courts, 11 J. Pub. L. 236 (1962).
74 See Freedman 113; Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common-
Law World 15-18 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
75 Schwartz 61-62.
76 E.g., Freedman; Hamson, Executive Discretion and Judicial Control (1954);
Schwartz. Translations of cases and other materials on French administrative law
can be found in von Mehren 138-336.
77 See Schwartz 35-37.
78 Drago, Some Recent Reforms of the French Conseil d'Etat, 13 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 1282, 1296-97 (1964).
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seriously effected the "judicial" nature of the Section du Contentieux39
Most members of the Conseil are chosen on the basis of their per-
formance at the National Administration School, entrance to which is
determined by examination. The remaining members are brought in after
outstanding performance in careers within the administration. Once on
the Conseil, advancement is by seniority only, thus eliminating any
accusations of political favoritism, which have sometimes been levelled
at the regular judiciary.80 The independence of the Conseil has been
further enhanced by a tradition of "de facto irremovability," 8' even
though no law expressly guarantees that members cannot be removed.
This tradition was broken in 1960 when the Government removed a
junior member who had been serving with the administration in Algeria
and was sharply critical of General De Gaulle's policy.8 2 The removal
provoked "severe criticism," 88 and the 1963 reform provided a series
of lesser sanctions to meet such situations in the future. It is doubtful
that any French Government would attempt to use the removal power
to influence decisions of the judicial section.
The cases heard by the judicial section fall into two groups: recours
de pleine juridiction and recours pour exc~s de pouvoir. The first aro
"proceedings to order the administration to take affirmative action, such
as the payment of money damages.18 4 The most important cases in this
group are tort and contract claims in which the plaintiff seeks to hold
the state liable.85 The recours pour excs de pouvoir is the "proceeding
to annul an ultra vires administrative act." 86 The Conseil may annul an
administrative decision on one of several grounds, generally listed as
"lack of authority (incompitence), failure to observe procedures re-
quired by law (vice de forme), abuse of power (ditournement de pou-
voir), and violation of the law (violation de la loi.)" 8 7 The development
of the recours pour exc~s de pouvoir has been the outstanding feature of
the Conseil's work. This remedy is the chief bulwark against arbitrary
administrative action.
The recours pour excs de pouvoir is available against acts of the
"administration," and it is essential to realize the breadth of application
79 E.g., Vedel, Droit administratif 348 (3d ed. 1964); Silvera, La r~forme du
Conseil d'Etat, [1963] S. Chron. 51, 60. But cf. Drago, supra note 78, at 1295-97.
For the circumstances which led to this reform see pp. 488-91 infra.
80 See Williams & Harrison 256.
81 Drago, supra note 78, at 1288.
82 See ibid.; Le Monde, Nov. 10, 1960, p. 1, col. 4; id., Nov. 11, 1960, p. 7, col. 3.
83 Drago, supra note 78, at 1296-97.
84 Schwartz 120.
85 This group also includes certain election and taxation cases. Rivero, Droit
administratif 188 (3d ed. 1965).
86 Schwartz 120.
87 Freedman 133.
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of this term in France. The "administration" includes everything from
local officials to the executive branch of the national government itself.88
The Conseil has treated the Government as one more agency carrying
out the legislature's will, and thus subject to review like other "admin-
istrative" agencies.8 9 The fact that the Government obviously performs
nonadministrative functions as well has led the Conseil to establish a
category of nonreviewable acts, to be discussed below. 90 In addition,
the Conseil has developed criteria of "standing," so that not every deci-
sion is automatically open to challenge.91
Among the "administrative" acts that the Conseil reviews is the exer-
cise of the executive's general rule-making power (pouvoir r~glemen-
taire) .92 The French executive branch has long possessed a rule-making
power, independent of express legislative delegation, both to aid in the
application of particular laws and to ensure in general the necessary
minimum of order within the state.93 Thus, for example, the President
of the Third Republic could promulgate by decree a highway code by
virtue of his inherent duty to maintain public order. 94 Since the middle
of the nineteenth century the Conseil d'Etat has treated as reviewable
these general regulations, usually entitled Dgcrets.95
It has also been common for the Parliament to lay down general
guidelines in an area and to "invite" the government to fill in the
details.9 6 When the government acts on this "invitation" it lays down
the rules in a Regulation of Public Administration (r~glement d'adminis-
tration publique). During the nineteenth century there was some doubt
whether these could be reviewed by the Conseil d'Etat. It was argued
that they represented a delegation of the legislative power, and thus like
any parliamentary law were beyond question by a court. 97 But in 1907
the Conseil d'Etat held that since r~glements d'administration publique
"emanate from an administrative authority" they are reviewable like
other administrative acts.9 8 The Conseil has also treated as reviewable
the "decree-laws" of the Third Republic, and their Fourth Republic
88 Waline, Droit administratif 4 (9th ed. 1963) ; Weil, Le droit administratif 6-7
(1964).89 Weil, op. cit. supra note 88, at 7-9.
90 See pp. 485-86 infra.
91 Rivero, op. cit. supra note 85, at 216-17.
92 Vedel, op. cit. supra note 79, at 33.
03 Id. at 12-15.
94 Labonne, Conseil d'Etat, Aug. 8, 1919, [1919] Recueil des arr~ts du Conseil
d'Etat [hereinafter cited as C.E.] 737.
95 Conclusions Tardieu in Chemins de fer de l'Est, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 6, 1907,
[1908] S. III. 1, 5, [1909] D. III. 57, 58.
96 See Vedel, op. cit. supra note 79, at 155-58.
97 See Tardieu, op. cit. supra note 95.
98 Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 6, 1907, [1907]
C.E. 913, [1909] D. III. 57, [1908] S. II. 1.
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successors.99 These took the form of grants by the legislature of "full
powers" to the government to deal with a particular problem. Thus,
although there is no judicial review of legislation in France, the Conseil
d'Etat has established review of the general rules that the executive
promulgates. Where the legislature had empowered the executive to act,
as in the "decree-laws," the scope of review was narrow. The Conseil
only considered whether the executive had stayed within the terms of the
enabling law,100 and it tended to construe these laws liberally. 1 1 How-
ever, toward the end of the Fourth Republic there were indications that
the Conseil would examine these administrative acts, as it examined
all others, in the light of the "general principles of law.' 0 2
Since 1945 the Conseil has, in effect, affirmed the existence of "great
principles whose recognition as rules of law is indispensable to complete
the judicial framework within which the nation must evolve."' 08 These
principles are of a higher order than the normal judge-made rules which
govern the typical tort or contract case.'0 4 An example is the decision in
Socigtg des concerts du conservatoire.10 5 Members of the plaintiff or-
chestra violated their contract, missing rehearsals in order to play in a
concert given by the French National Radio orchestra. Plaintiff took
disciplinary measures against them. The National Radio retaliated by
ceasing to broadcast any of plaintiff's concerts, although it had done
so in the past and continued to do so for other orchestras as a public
service. The Conseil condemned this action and granted damages, pri-
marily on the ground that the Radio "failed to observe the principle of
equality which controls the functioning of public services."' 106
This concern for equality has motivated the Conseil in its develop-
ment of many of the "general principles of law." Thus the Conseil has
insisted upon equal treatment for users of a public service, 10 7 for candi-
dates at a state examination,'0 " for state employees (fonctionnaires),109
and also upon equality between the sexes.110 The Conseil's work in this
99 Garrigou, Conseil d'Etat, March 6, 1956, [1956] C.E. 121, [1956] D.J. 253;
Union des vehicules industriels, Conseil d'Etat, June 25, 1937, [1937] C.E. 619,
[1937] D. I11 33, [1937] S. II. 97.
100 Braibant & Fournier, Chronique, 1956 Actualit6 Juridique II. 220, 221.
101 Vedel, op. cit. supra note 79, at 185.
102 Garrigou, Conseil d'Etat, March 6, 1956, [1956] C.E. 121, [1956] D.J. 253.
103 Letourneur, Les "principes g~n6raux du droit" dans la jurisprudence du Con-
seil d'Etat, 5 Etudes et documents 19 (1951).
104 See Rivero, op. cit. supra note 85, at 70-71. These principles are most fre-
quently applied in recours pour excs de pouvoir.
105 Conseil d'Etat, March 9, 1951, [1951] C.E. 151, [1951] S. III. 81.
106 Damages appear to have been nominal.
107 Soci6t6 du journal "L'Aurore", Conseil d'Etat, June 25, 1948, [1948] C.E.
289, [1948] D.J. 437, [1948] S. III. 69.
108 Beaufort, Conseil d'Etat, Oct. 19, 1960, [1960] C.E. 545.
109 Aurnage, Conseil d'Etat, Jan: 5, 1962, [19621 C.E. 9.
110 Demoiselle Bobard, Conseil d'Etat, July 3, 1936, [1936] C.E. 721, [1937] D.
III. 38.
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area resembles in many ways the Supreme Court's development of the
equal protection clause, employing such concepts as "reasonable clas-
sification.""' The Conseil has developed other "general principles" in
a manner which resembles the Supreme Court's handling of the due
process clause.112 These include the principle of nonretroactivity of
administrative acts,l l3 the principle of freedom of commerce and in-
dustry,11 4 and the development of procedural guarantees in administra-
tive hearings. 115
There has been considerable dispute among French legal scholars
over the sources and the exact nature of the "general principles of law."
Much like common law judges who "found" a preexisting law, the
Conseil "affirms the existence" 116 of principles independent of the judge's
will. At times the Conseil has indicated that the Preamble of the 1946
Constitution, reaffirmed by the 1958 Constitution, is the source of a
particular "general principle. 11 7 However, there have been many cases
in which the Conseil has not indicated any source.'1 8 Thus it has been
argued that the Conseil infers the "general principles of law" from the
totality of the laws and institutions" 9 or from the constitutional custom
of the country.120 Some have been unwilling to admit the independent
role which the Conseil plays in developing these principles.' 21 But it is
clear that "the judge's discovery is, in reality, largely a creative one:
in affirming the existence of a principle, he gives it the sanction which
it previously lacked, and thus places it among the rules of positive law."'122
Before 1958 there was also debate over the exact place of the "general
principles" within the hierarchy of laws. Most commentators said they
had the same force as statutes.123 Thus they were binding on the execu-
tive, always subordinate to La Loi, but not on Parliament. However,
the Conseil itself had indicated it considered the "general principles" of
supra-legislative or constitutional dimensions. In the famous Lamnotte
111 See Conseil national de l'ordre des m~decins, Conseil d'Etat, July 13, 1962,
[1962] C.E. 479.
112 Schwartz 211-16.
113 E.g., Ville de Lyon, Conseil d'Etat, May 5, 1962, [1962] C.E. 294.
114 See Mouvement franvais pour 'abondance, Conseil d'Etat, Nov. 6, 1959,
[1959] C.E. 580.
115 E.g., Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, Conseil d'Etat, May 5, 1944, [1944]
C.E. 133, [1945] D.J. 110, [1945] S. III. 14.
116 Rivero, op. cit. supra note 85, at 70.
117 Conf~d6ration nationale des Associations de sinistris, Conseil d'Etat, March
7, 1958, [1958] C.E. 152.
118 E.g., Soci~t6 des concerts du Conservatoire, Conseil d'Etat, March 9, 1951,
[1951] C.E. 151.119 Batailler 122-23.
120 Vedel, op. cit. supra note 79, at 203.
121 See Letourneur, supra note 103, at 29.
122 Rivero, op. cit. supra note 85, at 71.
123 E.g., Letourneur, supra note 103.
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case, the Conseil "interpreted" a statute contrary to the legislature's
clear intention in order to prevent the statute from infringing a general
principle. 2 4 The Conseil has consistently assumed that the legislature
does not wish to violate the "general principles of law" and has inter-
preted-statutes in accordance with this presumption.
125
The exact nature of the general principles had little impact on the
Conseil's ability to make administrative actions conform to them, because
the executive was subordinate both to the laws and to the Constitution.
The constitutional revolution of 1958 threatened to change this situation
by freeing the executive from its subordination to Parliament. Indeed,
"De Gaulle's Republic" posed many important problems for the Conseil
d'Etat, and in order to appreciate them it is necessary to consider the
1958 changes in some detail.
THE NEW REPUBLIC
A. Origins
The Fifth Republic dramatically changed the dynamics of French
institutions. The immediate cause of the Fourth Republic's downfall
was the Government's inability to deal with a revolt of the French army
and settlers in Algeria. Despite the formation of a solid government
under Pierre Pflimlin the total breakdown of the state was evident.
"Monsieur Pflimlin's Minister of War had no army; his Minister of
the Interior had no police; and his Minister for Algeria could not even
go there since he would have been arrested on the spot."'126
This breakdown was not a new phenomenon but a brutal demonstra-
tion of the fact that "the French state had been withering away for
years.'1 2 7 Ministerial instability, for many years the main handicap of
French parliaments, became intolerable during the Fourth Republic. 1 28
A deeply divided nation elected an equally divided Parliament, 129 in
which the large block of Communist deputies automatically voted against
every government. Indeed the internal schisms prevented any "consensus
of the citizens to accept the existing institutions as the normal framework
in which to deal with their differences."' 130 Despite its weaknesses the
124 Ministre de 1'agriculture v. Lamotte, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 17, 1950, [1950]
C.E. 110, [1950] D.J. 282, [1950] S. III. 65.
125 Batailler 130-31.
126 Werth, De Gaulle, A Political Biography 236 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Werth]. The quote is a paraphrase of M. Pflimlin's remarks at his last cabinet
meeting. Williams & Harrison 68.
127 Williams & Harrison 67.
128 See Drago, General Comparative View of the French Constitution, 21 Ohio
St. L.J. 535, 537 (1960). For a list of the twenty-five different governments of the
Fourth Republic see Fauvet, La IVe R~publique, Annexe 3 (1959).
129 Williams & Harrison 121.
130 Grosser, The Evolution of European Parliaments, Daedalus, Winter 1964,
p. 153.
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Fourth Republic might have survived-economically France was sound
-had it not had to face the political and moral problems of the loss of
empire. The inability to resolve the Algerian crisis caused the final
collapse.131
While the Republic crumbled, De Gaulle and the Gaullists maneu-
vered, and with consummate skill "he stepped resolutely into a vacant
place.' u3 2 His supporters in Algeria had satisfied the Right that De
Gaulle would carry out its program. Most of the liberals and moderates
in France saw him as the only acceptable alternative to civil war. (Guy
Mollet summed up their position as "always avoid civil war-especially
when you are sure to lose.") 133 The result was virtually carte blanche,
an unparalleled opportunity for De Gaulle and his chief constitutional
architect Michel Debr6 to establish in France the institutions they had
long considered necessary. Both De Gaulle and Debr6 had been con-
cerned over the endemic weakness of French governments and were
resolved to restore what Debr6 called the "authority" of the state.13 4
Although their views diverged on some points, particularly in regard to
the role of Parliament, both emphasized the need for strong executive
leadership. 13 The result of their efforts is a curious hybrid, both "pres-
idential and parliamentary."'13 6
B. Institutions
The Fifth Republic institutes a dual executive composed of the
President of the Republic and of the Government (Cabinet), presided
over by the Prime Minister. Each one possesses significant powers (a
situation which in the future may lead to conflicts between them). 1 7
The President was originally chosen by an electoral college of eighty
thousand "notables." In 1962 this was changed to universal suffrage.
The President has significant powers which his predecessors did
not. Chief among these are the unrestricted power to dissolve Par-
liament (article 12) ;1"8 the power to institute a referendum (article
11) ;139 and complete, indeed dictatorial, authority during a national
emergency of whose existence he is the sole judge (article 16).140 The
1'1 Duverger, La Cinqui~me R~publique 1 (3d ed. 1963).
132 Taylor, Fabulous Monster, The New York Review of Books, May 12, 1966,
p. 17.
133 Williams & Harrison 69.
134 Friedrich, The New French Constitution in Political and Historical Perspec-
tive, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 815 (1960).
135 Ibid.
136 Chapsal, La Cinqui~me R~publique 80 (Les Cours de Droit 1962-63).
137 Duverger, op. cit. supra note 131, at 35-36.
18 See id. at 44-45.
139 In this, however, he must have the cg-operation of the Government or of Par-
liament.
140 He may invoke his powers "when the institutions of the Republic, the inde-
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text of the Constitution appears to create a President along the lines
De Gaulle had advocated: an "arbiter," above the parties and the day
to day political process, capable of intervening forcefully when that
protess breaks down.
14 1
The normal executive power is exercised by the Government under
the direction of the Prime Minister. Article 20 declares: "the Govern-
ment determines and conducts the Nation's policy." The President
names the Prime Minister who then forms a Government. Unlike the
Fourth Republic, deputies who become cabinet members must resign
their seats (article 23). The Government is responsible before Parlia-
ment, but the new Constitution makes it relatively difficult for Parliament
to bring a Government down.1 42 The Government exercises its power
by virtue of the pouvoir riglementaire, that is, the authority to enact
decrees and ordinances. The Government may, as before, enact decrees
to implement laws. More importantly, the new Constitution limits Par-
liament's power to certain matters; all other areas are ruled by the
"pouvoir riglementaire."
Articles 34, restricting Parliament's jurisdiction to certain specified
matters, is a radical break from French constitutional tradition. Not only
are these matters (the domaine de la loi) explicitly spelled out; article
37 states that all other matters belong to the Government's pouvoir
riglementaire. And, as noted above, the Conseil Constitutionnel has
tended to interpret these two articles in favor of the Government's
power.1 43 The extent of the change should not be overstated. 4 4 The
domain of article 34 is not narrow,'145 and there is some possibility of
Parliament's widening its jurisdiction. 146 Nonetheless, it is significant
that in many areas a once omnipotent Parliament can no longer act. The
short sessions (article 28) and the Government's extensive powers in
.debates (article 44) are further examples, of the lesser role of Par-
liament.
The Government, on the other hand, may be able to enter Parliament's
pendence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory, or the execution of its inter-
national engagements are seriously and immediately threatened. . . ." He must first
"consult" the Prime Minister, the presidents of the two chambers, and the Conseil
Constitutionnel.
141 Drago, supra note 128, at 548-49.
142 Duverger op. cit. supra note 131, at 149-50.
148 See p. 469 supra.
144 See Tunc, The Fifth Republic, the Legislative Power, and Constitutional Re-
view, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 335, 337-39 (1960).
145 Statutes govern such matters as civil liberties, military obligations, nation-
ality, status of persons, criminal law and procedure, levying of taxes and issuing of
currency, and nationalization of industry. These are other areas in which the legis-
lature can only lay down general principles. These include, among others, the organ-
ization of the national defense, local goverment, the law of obligations, and labor
and social security matters.
146 Drago, supra note 128, at 544.
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domain. Article 38 provides that Parliament can grant the Government,
"for the execution of its program" and "for a limited time," the power
to enact ordinances (ordonnances) covering matters in the domain of
the law. This is essentially a constitutional recognition of the prior
practice of decree-laws. 147 Ratification by Parliament of the Govern-
ment's actions is necessary, but the Government need only introduce a
ratification bill to satisfy this requirement.148
C. The Evolution of the Fifth Republic
When the new Constitution was enacted observers were divided as
to whether it represented a major change in the structure of French
government. 49 Events since 1958 have borne out those who said that it
did. Parliament has played an unimportant role throughout the Fifth
Republic, and the President has become increasingly predominant within
the executive branch.
All observers agree that Parliament has played a secondary role. 150
It has not been the significant forum for national issues which Debr6
had hoped,1 51 and most important decisions have come from the execu-
tive. Only once has Parliament seriously challenged General De Gaulle.
In 1962 the Government was overthrown on a motion censuring De
Gaulle's decision to amend the Constitution by a direct referendum which
by-passed Parliament.152 De Gaulle thereupon dissolved Parliament and
won a decisive victory in the ensuing election.
It was evident from the outset that General De Gaulle's personality
would be an important factor in the evolution of the Fifth Republic.
In effect, he has increased the power of his office far beyond what the
Constitution intended.53 As early as 1959 the President of the Assembly
informed the Gaullist party congress of a "reserved domain" in which
the President would exercise sole power. 54 This included defense,
diplomacy, and Algeria. Reading the Constitution, one would think
that these matters belong to the Government which "determines and
conducts the policy of the nation" (article 20). The substitution of
M. Pompidou for M. Debr6 in 1962 has made the Government even less
of an independent policy making organ than it was before.155
147 Duverger, op. cit. supra note 131, at 73.
148 See id. at 74.
149 Compare Drago, supra note 128, with Duverger, op. cit. supra note 131, at
16-24.
150 E.g., Chapsal, op. cit. supra note 136, at 77-78; Viansson-Pont6, Prelude A
la campagne, Le Monde, July 8,1966, p. 7, col. 2.
151 For Debr6's goals, see Williams & Harrison 148.
152 A decision of questionable constitutionality, see Chapsal, op. cit. supra note
136, at 183-84.
153 Duverger, op. cit. supra note 131, at 14, 17-18.
154 Id. at 86.
155 Chapsal, op. cit. supra note 136, at 172-73.
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The dominant aspect of the Fifth Republic, both in its institutions
and in its evolution, is the primacy of the executive. Inevitably, this
change raised the question whether the Conseil d'Etat could continue to
act as "censor of the executive branch." The great bulk of the Conseil's
work-torts, contracts, and disputes involving administrative acts-
would not be affected. But one might wonder how great a control it
could exercise over the Government, particularly when that Government
was dominated by a monarchical figure who believed that governmental
power should be exercised free from "the frowning disapproval of
lawyers."1 56
THE CONSEIL D'ETAT AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
1 57
A. Control over the Government
(1) Article 37
Perhaps the most important question was whether the Conseil could
review the Government's decrees when it exercised its autonomous
rule-making power (pouvoir riglementaire autonome) under article 37.
Many commentators assumed that the Conseil could do so,15 8 and there
was evidence that the drafters of the Constitution had assumed that it
would.1 59 Nonetheless, the issue was not free from doubt, 16 0 and a strong
argument against review could be made. The Constitution gave the
Government normative power that had formerly belonged to the legis-
lature (article 37). And not only was the Government now doing the
same sort of thing the legislature did; in its domain it was free from
any interference by Parliament. Did this not mean that the Government
in its rule-making domain was as sovereign as the legislature in the
domaine de la loi?161 An authority which "determines and conducts the
policy of the nation" is something more than part of the "administration."
Would it not be inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution for the
Conseil d'Etat to review the pouvoir riglementaire autonome?16 2 The
Conseil's decision in Syndicat g~n~ral des inggnieurs-conseils'6 3 an-
swered this question in a manner worthy of Chief Justice Marshall.
The 1946 Constitution gave the Prime Minister full law-making au-
156 Quoted in Drago, supra note 128, at 556.
157 See Weil, The Strength and Weaknesses of French Administrative Law,
1965 Camb. L.J. 242, 248-51.
158 E.g., Tunc, supra note 144, at 343.
159 See Burdeau, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques 539 (1965).
160 See De Soto, La Loi and le r~glement dans la Constitution du 4 octobre,
1958, 1959 Revue de droit public, 240, 292.
161 Vedel, Droit administratif 38 (3d ed. 1964).
162 Ibid.
165 Conseil d'Etat, June 26, 1959, [1959] C.E. 394, [1959] D.J. 541, [1959] S.J.
202.
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thority in the colonies during a transition period. 6 't Under this power
he had issued a decree in 1947 regulating the architectural profession
in the colonies. This decree gave a virtual monopoly to those who had
an architect's diploma. In metropolitan France "technical' engineers"
could design industrial and commercial buildings but not houses. Under
the decree only architects could design any building in the colonies. In
1959 a request by the engineers to annul the decree came before the
Conseil. For a number of reasons the matter had lost all practical im-
portance. Although the decree had been published in the Journal Oficiel,
it had never been promulgated or applied in the colonies. Furthermore,
the Minister for Overseas France had announced that he did not intend
to apply it. More basically, there was virtually no place in which it could
have been applied. The colonies of 1947 had either become independent
states or "overseas territories". which, under French law, had the power
to regulate the professions. The only possible place of application was
the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, an area in which the volume
of architectural business is slight.165 Nonetheless, the Conseil heard the
case. It concluded that the decree was valid in that there was no violation
of the general principle of freedom of commerce and industry. 166
The case is important because the Prime Minister in 1947 was exer-
cising an autonomous rule-making power very similar to that granted
in the new Constitution's article 37.167 In his "conclusions" on the case,
the Government Commissioner (Commissaire du gouvernement) stressed
this similarity and argued that decrees promulgated under either power
should be reviewable. 168 The Conseil's laconic holding shows clearly an
acceptance of this position. It held that the Prime Minister had been
obliged to respect "the general principles of law which are binding on
all rule-making authorities" ("les principes g~ngraux du droit qui . . .
s'imposent a toute autorit6 r~glenentaire"). As later cases have made
clear, the reference to "toute autoritg r~glementaire" included article 37
decrees.' 6 9 The significance of the holding was immediately recognized,
and the commentators approved, chiefly on the ground that an absence
164 Constitution of 1946, arts. 47, 104.
165 In 1950 the population of the two islands was 4,606. Encyclopedia Britannica
853 (1961).
166 The facts are taken from the "conclusions" of the Commissaire du gouverne-
ment M. Fournier, 1959 Revue de droit public 1004.
167 Drago, Note to Syndicat g~nral des ing~nieurs-conseils, [1959] S.J. 203.
168 1959 Revue de droit public 1010. The Commissaire du gouvernement is a
member of the Conseil who presents an independent view of the case at bar. In his
arguments ("conclusions") he reviews the authorities and gives the members of the
tribunal his view as to the proper decision. For a description of the Commissaire,
see Schwartz 138-39.
169 E.g., Socit6 Eky, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 12, 1960, [1960] C.E. 101, [1960]
D.J. 263, [1960] S.J. 131.
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of any review would have left the citizens without safeguards against
governmental actions. 170
The case not only established the reviewability of article 37 decrees,
but, of equal importance, it held that they could not violate the "general
principles of law." The Conseil thus appears to have answered in the
negative the question whether these principles are of legislative force.
For since the Government's pouvoir r~glementaire autonome is free
from any control by Parliamentary statutes, it would seem that "prin-
ciples" having the hierarchical value of statutes could not control the
exercise of this power. 171 Most French jurists treat the case as estab-
lishing the "constitutional or 'quasi-constitutional' value of the 'general
principles of law.' "172
This "promotion" of the general principles 173 has raised again the
question of their source. In view of the "constitutional' nature of the
"general principles," should not this category be limited to those
principles which are enunciated in constitutional texts ?174 Most of the
general principles can be found in the 1946 Preamble and the Declaration
of the Rights of Man. In 1960 the Conseil indicated that it considered
these documents as part of the applicable positive law. 1 75 Thus it can
be argued that the term "general principles of law" is now only a
synonym for the rules of the Preamble and the Declaration, and that
the Conseil had previously used the term because it was not willing to
recognize that these documents had the force of positive law.'7 6 The
difficulty with this argument is that some of the important "general
principles" are not found in either document. These include the principle
of nonretroactivity of administrative acts, the rights of parties in admin-
istrative proceedings, and the availability of review of administrative
acts.177 Some jurists have resolved this problem by reasoning that while
these principles are not directly found in the texts, they are the "indis-
pensable consequence" of what is in the texts. 178 (The formula is "posed
by the [texts] or deduced by the judge from these declarations.") 179
170 E.g., Chapus, De la soumission au droit des r~glements autonomes, [1960]
D. Chron. 119.
171 Drago, supra note 167, at 204-05; Fournier, supra note 166, at 1011-12.
172 Batailler 132. Contra, Chapus, supra note 170, at 124.
178 Braibant, L'arrft "Syndicat g~nral des ing~nieurs-conseils" et la th6orie des
principes g6n6raux du droit, 16 Etudes et documents 67, 68 (1962).
174 See Rivero, Droit administratif 72 (3d ed. 1965).
175 Socit6 Eky, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 12, 1960, [1960] C.E. 101, [1960] D.J. 263,
[1960] S.J. 131.
176 Cf. Batailler 139-40.
177 Chapus, supra note 170, at 122-23.
178 Fournier, supra note 166, at 1012; see Batailler 138-39.
179 Fournier, supra note 166, at 1013.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
It has also been argued that the Conseil infers the general principles
from constitutional "custom" as well as from constitutional texts.
8 0
The Conseil's language in subsequent cases does not answer the ques-
tion. In one case it referred to the "principles recalled in the preamble
of the Constitution of 1946, to which the Constitution of October 4, 1958
refers .... ,"181 Yet in other cases involving the "general principles" it
has either merely cited the Constitution in the list of authorities 8 2 or
not cited it at all.183 Perhaps the precise answer to this doctrinal con-
troversy is of secondary importance. The essential point is that "les
principes g6ngraux du droit" constitute an effective body of rules which
the Conseil uses and develops in its review of the Government's "laws."
Since 1959 the Conseil has reviewed numerous decrees and has invali-
dated some for violating the general principles.'8 4 It has, however, been
criticized for timidity in this review.'8 5 Yet such criticism should not
obscure the importance of the establishment of judicial review of article
37 decrees.
(2) Article 38
Once the Conseil d'Etat had decided that the pouvoir r6glementaire of
article 37 was subject to its review, it seemed only a short step to treat
the ordinances of article 38 as equally reviewable. Though given the
more imposing, monarchical title of "ordinances" these too come from
the government. Such a solution seemed natural in view of the fact that
article 38 is primarily a recognition of the prior practice of "decree-laws"
which the Conseil had reviewed. 186 Indeed, Debr himself had made
the analogy in a parliamentary debate.' s7 And while article 38 speaks of
''measures," article 92-which gave the Government power to enact
ordinances during the first four months of the new Republic-spoke
of "legislative measures with the force of law."' 18  Nonetheless some
writers argued that executive law-making under article 38 was not
reviewable even if that under article 37 was. 189 This reasoning was
180 Vedel, op. cit. supra note 161, at 203.
181 Syndicat chritien de l'administration pinitentiare, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 6,
1963, [1963] C.E. 607.
182 Soci&6 de ptroles Shell-Berre et autres, Conseil d'Etat, June 19, 1964,
[1964] C.E. 344.
183 D'Oriano, Conseil d'Etat, Oct. 23, 1964, [19641 C.E. 486, 1965 Revue de droit
public 282 (conclusions Bertrand).
184 D'Oriano, supra note 183; Jourde & Maleville, Conseil d'Etat, Sept. 28, 1962,
[1962] C.E. 508.
185 L'huillier, Note to Soci~ti Eky, [1960] D.J. 263, 264.
186 Debbasch, Les ordonnances de l'article 38 dans la Constitution du 4 octobre
1958, [1964] Semaine Juridique 1701, § 7.
18 7 journal Officiel, Debates, Senate, Feb. 3, 1960, p. 37.
188 These were held immune from review by the Conseil in Socit6 Eky, Conseil
d'Etat, Feb. 12, 1960, [1960] C.E. 101, [1960] D.J. 263, [1960] S.J. 131.
189 E.g., De Soto, supra note 160, at 287-88.
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apparently based on the new Constitution's rigid distinction between
the "domain of the law" (article 34) and the "domain of the rbglement"
(article 37). Whatever was in the law's domain would have the law's
immunity regardless of who the author was.190
The Conseil settled the matter in 1961 by reviewing and invalidating
an article 38 "ordinance."'' The law of February 4, 1960, passed during
a critical time in Algeria, authorized the Government to take "measures
normally in the domain of the law and necessary to assure the main-
tenance of order." One article of the ordinance in question determined
who were to be the representatives of the police on a certain commission.
It declared that those chosen at an earlier election would continue to
serve. In fact, this election had been hotly disputed, and a challenge in
the administrative courts was likely. Thus the ordinance would have
the effect of foreclosing the normally available review. But the avail-
ability of review of administrative acts is a "general principle of law."
The Conseil held that the Government had not been granted "the power
to withdraw certain administrative acts from any judicial control by
declaring them valid." Thus article 38 ordinances, like article 37 decrees,
must conform to the "general principles of law."'1 92 It is also generally
assumed that the Conseil will examine article 38 ordinances to deter-
mine whether the Government has gone beyond the terms of the enabling
act and exercised a legislative power broader than that granted. 198
When article 38 is in question there is an important limitation to the
Conseil's power of review, not present in article 37 situations. The
executive cannot violate the "general principles of law," but the legis-
lature can. Thus it would seem that Parliament could authorize the
Government to violate the general principles while promulgating ordi-
nances in the domain of the law, since the executive would be acting
"under cover" of the law.'9 This was, in effect, the solution the Conseil
appeared to have reached with respect to the "decree-laws" under the
Fourth Republic. In the famous Garrigou case' 95 the Conseil presumed
that Parliament had not wanted the Government to violate the general
principle of nonretroactivity. Thus the tribunal invalidated a retroactive
tax increase. This decision would seem to establish that unless an
enabling act specifically authorized the Government to derogate from
the general principles, the Conseil would invalidate any such deviation.
190 Debbasch, supra note 186, at § 7.
191 Fkdration nationale des syndicats de police, Conseil d'Etat, Nov. 24, 1961,
[1961] C.E. 658, [1962] D.J. 424.
192 Fromont, note to F~dration nationale des syndicats de police, [1962] D.J.
425-26'
198 Debbasch, supra note 186, at § 26.
194 Id. at § 32.
195 Conseil d'Etat, March 16, 1956, [1956] C.E. 121, [1956] D.J. 253.
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However, two years later the Conseil implied such an authorization,
relying apparently on the breadth of the enabling act and the emergency
situation in Algeria.9 6
The 1961 decision is more in harmony with the Garrigou approach. 197
The presumption that Parliament does not want the Government to
violate the "general principles" would merely be an application of the
Conseil's general method of "interpreting" statutes, i.e. the presumption
that Parliament itself does not wish to violate these principles. 198
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the Conseil will take a case by
case approach with article 38, and that it will examine the breadth of
the enabling act to determine from its "spirit" whether permission to
violate the general principles is implied. 199
B. Control over the President
(1) Article 16
Article 38 is really an example of joint law-making by the President
and the Government. The latter draws up the ordinances, but they must
be signed by the President, which also gives him the power not to
sign.200 In other cases, the President acts alone as law-maker. The most
famous is article 16 of the Constitution, dealing with national emer-
gencies. When the President has decided to apply it and has gone
through the proper formalities, 201 he may take "measures required by
the circumstances" in order to "restore to the public powers, in the least
possible delay, the means of accomplishing their mission" (article 16).
In the early years of the Fifth Republic the question whether the Conseil
d'Etat could review these measures was the subject of much debate.
There were some who argued the situation was similar to article 38.
The President is temporarily empowered to act in the domain of the law,
but he remains an executive authority whose acts are subject to review
before the Conseil.20 2 An analogy from prior case law was invoked.
Under the Third and Fourth Republics the Conseil had held that in
"exceptional circumstances" the Government could deal with legislative
matters without a prior authorization and could disregard laws. 20 3
All acts were subject to review by the Conseil, but a very lenient standard
106 Syndicat des propri~taires de forts de chines-lieges d'Alg6rie, Conseil d'Etat,
Feb. 7, 1958, [1958] C.E. 74.
197 Silvera, Variations sur le th~me des ordonnances, [1963] Dalloz, Bulletin
legislatif, chronique 149, 160.
198 See text at notes 124-25 supra.
199 Debbasch, supra note 186, at § 32.
200 Duverger, La Cinquirne Rgpublique 74-75 (3d ed. 1963).
201 See note 140 supra.
202 See Vedel, op. cit. supra note 161, at 26.
203 Rivero, op. cit. supra note 174, at 78-82; Waline, Droit administratif 653-57
(9th ed. 1963).
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was applied in view of the "exceptional circumstances." Thus article 16
could be viewed as merely institutionalizing this case law. 20 4
The argument that article 16 measures are reviewable is open to
serious criticism. To begin with, the analogy to article 38 is not con-
vincing, since, under that article, the Government's ordinances must
be ratified, expressly or impliedly, by Parliament. There is no such
requirement in the case of article 16.205 More importantly, the argument
for reviewability ignores the basic transformation of the executive, and
particularly of the Presidency, under the new Constitution. Prior to
1962 most of the leading French jurists were in fact maintaining that
there could be no review of article 16 measures. 20 6 There were two
grounds for this position. The first invoked the spirit of the Constitution,
stressing the new importance of the President.20 7 Article 5 declares that
he "safeguards the respect of the Constitution. He ensures, through his
arbitration, the regular functioning of the public powers and the con-
tinuity of the state. He is the guarantor of national independence, the
integrity of the territory, and of the respect of the Community agree-
ments and of treaties." And article 16 is the application of the concepts
expressed in article 5; when the other powers are incapable of acting or
of imposing their will, the President steps in to fill the vacuum. He
becomes at that moment the incarnation of national sovereignty. 208 Thus
review of his actions would be contrary to the tradition of the supremacy
of the general will.
The second argument against any review is drawn from one of the
developments of prior case law, the act. of. government (acte de gou-
vernement). Under the Third and Fourth Republics the Conseil had
considered the President and the Government as executive or admin-
istrative authorities subject to review by it. Yet there were certain
actions that it refused to review. The jurists grouped these matters
under the heading of acte de gouvernement, although the Conseil itself
never used this term in a decision until 1962.209
La doctrine could never agree on how to determine what was an acte
de gouvernement,2 10 and the Conseil was not much help. It was generally
agreed the cases could be grouped under the following headings:
"1. Acts of the executive in its relations with the legislature;
204 See Lamarque, LUgalit6 constitutionnelle et contr6le juridictionel des actes
pris en vertu de l'article 16, [1962] Semaine Juridique § 1711.
205 Ibid.
206 E.g., Rivero, op. cit. supra note 174, at 63-64; Vedel, op. cit. supra note 161,
at 26-27.
207 See Lamarque, supra note 204.
208 See Galabert & Gentot, note on Rubin de Servens, [1962] Actualit6 Juridique
214, 215.
209 Berlia, note to Rubin de Servens, 1962 Revue de droit public 288-89.
210 See Vedel, op. cit. supra note 161, at 220-25.
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2. Acts involving the relations of the French government with a
foreign power ....
3. Certain acts related to the conduct of war and national de-
fenses." 211 Perhaps it is best to see in the concept of acte de gouvernement
a recognition by the Conseil that the executive, even under prior Re-
publics, really was more than just part of the administration. At times
it performed an administrative function, but at other times it performed
a governmental function. The acte de gouvernement can thus be re-
viewed as an attempt to separate out "governmental" matters which it is
inappropriate for an "administrative" court to review. 212
It was argued that the acte de gouvernement cases applied to article
16.218 The invocation of this article certainly involves the relations
between the President and the other powers of government since he,
to some extent, replaces them. And perhaps the institution of a "tempo-
rary dictatorship" 214 is not something a court can do much about. Might
it not be wiser to leave the matter to Parliament, which could impeach
the President for treason or take other measures ?215
On April 3, 1961, faced with a revolt of the French Army in Algeria,
De Gaulle invoked article 16.216 Among the measures he took was the
creation of a special military court to judge those connected with crimes
against "the security of the state and the discipline of the Army, com-
mitted in connection with the events of Algiers." Defendants before that
court brought a recours pour exc~s de pouvoir to annul the decision
creating it. They argued that the circumstances had not justified in-
voking article 16. In addition they attacked the new court itself, on two
grounds drawn from the general principles of law. The first ground
was that the investigation leading to indictment (l'instruction) was not
in the hands of a judge. The second ground was one of nonretroactivity;
the special tribunal could judge offenses committed before the date of
its establishment.
In Rubin de Serven 217 the Conseil first held that the decision to in-
voke article 16 and decisions as to its duration were actes de gouverne-
ment which it would not consider. As to the measures taken under
article 16, the Conseil held that it would review those which fell in the
domaine r~glementaire of article 37 but not those in the article 34 domain
211 Schwartz 160-61.
212 Batailler 231-32.
218 Vedel, Droit administratif 27 (2d ed. 1961).
214 Ibid.
215 See Henry, conclusions to Rubin de Servens, 1962 Revue de droit public
294,* 303.
216 See Pickles, Article 16 in Practice, 1963 Pub. L. 23.
217 Conseil d'Etat, March 2, 1962, [1962] C.E. 143, [1962] D.J. 307, [1962] S.J.
147.
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of the law. Since the creation of new courts is one of the subjects listed
in article 34, the measure in question "which bears on legislative matters
-presents the character of a legislative act which the administrative
judge cannot review."
The commissaire du gouvernement, who argued for this result, based
his reasoning primarily on historical grounds. In the past, when one
authority had held both the legislative and the executive authority, e.g.,
the Vichy Government and the Liberation Government, the Conseil had
distinguished between measures of an "administrative" and of a "legis-
lative" character, reviewing only the former.2 1 8 The commissaire also
stressed that the general principles of French public law demand some
control of executive acts.219 Undoubtedly the Conseil wished to preserve
a partial control in article 16 situations.
Yet it is doubtful that this control will be very effective. 220 Most of
the measures which seriously affect individual liberties will probably
fall in the domain of the law and thus be immune from review.221 (In
examining the implementation of these measures by lower officials the
Conseil will probably assume that the President did not wish to violate
the general principles of law.) 222 Even when a matter is deemed "admin-
istrative" the Conseil will undoubtedly allow the President great leeway
in view of the "exceptional circumstances. '223 The Conseil will not
directly question the wisdom of invoking article 16, and it will probably
not do so indirectly by deeming particular measures unjustified. 224
Some control is no doubt better than none at all. Yet it is by no
means certain that the Conseil will again exercise even the limited con-
trol established by Rubin de Servens. Since 1965 the President is elected
by universal suffrage. Since he is now, like Parliament, a direct repre-
sentative of the general will, it would seem that all of his decisions should
benefit from the same immunity. 225 The whole question of review of
presidential law-making would be somewhat academic if article 16 were
the only example of it, since recourse to that article is likely to be
extremely rare. But General De Gaulle has discovered in the resources
of the Constitution another basis for presidential law-making: the ena-
bling referendum.
218 Henry, supra note 215, at 310-12.
219 Id. at 308.
220 Berlia, supra note 209, at 292-93.
221 Lamarque, supra note 204. See Ministre de l'Intgrieur v. Herbert, Conseil
d'Etat, Oct. 22, 1965, [1965] C.E. - (measure under article 16 restrictive of
individual liberty held within legislative domain).
222 See D'Oriano, Conseil d'Etat, Oct. 23, 1964, [1964] C.E. 486, 1965 Revue
de droit public 282 (conclusions Bertrand).
223 This is the solution for which the Commissaire du Gouvernement argued in
Rubin de Servens. 1962 Revue de droit public at 308.
224 Cf. Vedel, op. cit. supra note 213, at 27.
225 Batailler 521-22.
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(2) Ordinances promulgated by virtue of a referendum
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic accords the referendum an
important place. Article 3 declares that "national sovereignty belongs
to the people, who exercise it through their representatives and by
referendum." According to article 11 the subjects of referenda are the
organization of the public powers, Community Agreements, and treaties
which would affect the functioning of institutions. General De Gaulle
has interpreted these provisions liberally and in a manner which has
led to criticism. 226 In April of 1962 he used the referendum as a source
of temporary legislative power. The main objective of the referendum
was to approve the peace terms concluded with the Algerian rebels on
March 18 and the Government's declaration of March 19 relative to the
future of Algeria. Article 2 of the referendum empowered the President
to "enact, through ordinances, or as the case may be, through decrees
agreed on by the Cabinet, all legislative or administrative [rgglemen-
taire] measures relative to the application of the Government's declara-
tion of March 19, 1962." Whether the Conseil d'Etat could review these
measures was a new and difficult question. The Constitution gave no
guide; indeed, it said nothing at all about the whole procedure.
The most analogous of existing institutions was the article 38 ordi-
nance; and this analogy was favorable to review.2 27 The President, like
the Government, is part of the executive branch. In both cases the
"legislator" gives the executive temporary permission to enter the
domain of the law in order to carry out the legislator's will. 228 In each
case there is a specific goal: '"the application of the Government's
declarations of March 19, 1962," and "the execution of its [the Gov-
ernment's] program" (article 38). And in each case there is a limited
time: until the new Algerian institutions have been established, in the
case of the referendum, and "within a limited period of time" in the
case of article 38.229
However, the language of the referendum itself seemed to militate
against this view. The dual reference to ordinances and decrees, and
to legislative and administrative (r~glementaire) measures would indicate
that the ordinances have legislative force and thus are free from re-
view. 230 And the analogy to article 38 can be rejected since there is no
ratification. Admittedly, ratification by another referendum would be
226 E.g., Duverger, op. cit. supra note 200, at 50-57. See Chapsal, La Cinquiime
R6publique 72 (Les Cours de droit 1962-63).
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unwieldly, but ratification by Parliament could have been provided for.2 31
In a major decision, laden with dramatic political consequences, the
Conseil held referendum ordinances reviewable.2 32 In the early months
of 1962 the Secret Army Organization (O.A.S.), a terrorist organiza-
tion pledged to prevent De Gaulle from conceding Algeria's inde-
pendence, stepped up its attacks in France. The previous September the
O.A.S. had almost succeeded in assassinating the General himself and
were to try again.23 For De Gaulle the elimination of these "blood-
drenched madmen" 234 became a predominant concern. Yet the military
court he had established under article 16 to deal with the military sup-
porters of the O.A.S. seemed half-hearted in its dedication. In May it
sentenced General Salan, head of the O.A.S., to life imprisonment
despite the Government's strong request for the death penalty. Dissatis-
fied with his tribunal, De Gaulle dissolved it and set up another one on
June first: The Court of Military Justice.2 35 Unlike the previous court,
this court was established via an ordinance which De Gaulle promul-
gated under the power granted in the April referendum. The Court of
Military Justice began operations immediately and imposed sentences
of satisfactory severity. On September seventeenth it condemned to
death Andre Canal, an O.A.S. leader, whose arrest had provided the
only moment of humor in that group's tragic history.23 6 Canal thereupon
brought a recours pour excs de pouvoir before the Conseil, attacking
the ordinance which created the military court.
The Conseil rendered its decision on October nineteenth.2 37 It held
that referendum ordinances were exercises of the pouvoir r~glementaire
and hence reviewable administrative acts.238 The object of the referen-
dum was found to be "not to enable the President of the Republic to
231 Ibid.
232 Canal, Conseil d'Etat, Oct. 19, 1962, [1962] C.E. 552, [1962] D.J. 687.
233 Werth 271, 292-93.
234 Id. at 290.
235 "The fearful crise-de conscience this whole sorry business had created among
part of the army elite may be judged from the fact that, soon after his appoint-
ment to the new Court, General de Larminat [the presiding judge] committed
suicide." Werth 289.
236 Canal, known as "Black Monocle," was arrested on May 5, 1962 after the
Government received word that he was hiding in an apartment building in the
seventeenth arrondissement of Paris. The Government sent special agents, disguised
as house painters, to the scene. The "painters" arrested Canal when he left the
building. However, an alert bystander telephoned the Paris Police and reported
that a group of house painters were attempting to kidnap someone in the seven-
teenth arrondissement. The police arrived on the scene, and the "painters" had to
prove their identity before they could take Canal to jail. See Le Monde, Sept. 9-10,
1962, p. 6, col. 4.
237 [1962] C.E. 552, [1962] D.J. 687.
238 An ordinance "conserve le caract~re d'un acte administratif et est susceptible,
comme tel, d'tre d~fr6 au Conseil d'Etat par la voie du recours pour excs de
pouvoir."
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exercise the legislative power himself, but only to authorize him excep-
tionally to use . .. his pouvoir r~glementaire to take, by means of
ordinances, measures which are normally within the domain of the
law. .. ." Thus by continuing to regard the President as an adminis-,
trative official, despite contrary arguments which might be drawn from
the nature of the new regime, the Conseil had ensured judicial control
over this type of law-making. The holding on the merits made clear that
this control was more than a mere paper guarantee; the Conseil struck
down the ordinance creating the court. It held that the referendum did
empower the President to create a military court. However, the Pres-
ident had to respect the general principles of penal law (garanties
essentielles de la d~fense), unless the gravity of the circumstances neces-
sitated violation of these principles. In view of the court's organization-
it had no civilian members-and because its decisions were specifically
declared nonappealable, the Conseil held that the general principles
had not been respected.
The Government's reaction was immediate and violent. Shortly after'
the decision was announced, the Prime Minister's office issued a com-
muniqu6 denouncing it as an "encourgement of subversion and assassin-
ation. ' 2 9 The communique reproached the Conseil for substituting "the
judgment of the administrative court in place of the rights of the con--
stitutional authorities chosen by the voters in an area which touches on
their fundamental responsibility and on the very existence of the na-
tion."'240 Subsequently the Government rebuked the Conseil for having
"exceeded its proper sphere" (sorti de son domaine) and indicated that
it intended to disregard the decision. 241
There loomed the ominous prospect of a direct clash between the
Government and the Conseil. The day after the decision Canal took
an appeal from his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals (the
Chambre Criminelle of the Cour de Cassation) .242 Yet the Government
had indicated it considered the Conseil's decision invalid, and Canal's
lawyers were worried that the sentence of death would be carried
out.248 Fortunately, a direct confrontation was avoided. On November
twenty-eighth De Gaulle "commuted" Canal's sentence to life imprison-
ment (indicating that in his mind there was still a valid sentence to
commute) .244 And in January Parliament passed a law which appeared to
239 Le Monde, Oct. 21-22, 1962, p. 4, col. 3.
240 Ibid.
241 Le Monde, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 6, col. 5.
242 Le Monde, Oct. 23, 1962, p. 3, col. 3.
243 Ibid.
244 Le Monde, Nov. 29, 1962, p. 1, col. 4.
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validate the actions of the Special Military Court.245 On March 14, 1963,
Canal withdrew his appeal.
246
But the Government's displeasure at the decision continued unabated.
Rumors began to circulate that an upcoming reform of the Conseil
would, in fact, reflect this displeasure. 247 In particular, it was feared the
reform would make serious inroads on the Conseil's power to review the
exercise of the pouvoir r6glementaire.248 The prospect of curbing the
Conseil sharply aroused public opinion, and the Conseil's role was vig-
orously defended. 249 Perhaps because of this strong reaction, the ultimate
reform did not affect the Conseil's jurisdiction.250 Its power to review
executive law-making had emerged intact from this "struggle for judicial
supremacy."
It is doubtful that the particular control established in Canal will
ever again be effective. As was pointed out in connection with article
16, the fact that the President is now elected by universal suffrage
militates against review of his actions.2 51 Furthermore, the referendum
ordinances promulgated in 1962 are no longer subject to challenge. On
January 15, 1963, Parliament created a Court of State Security. Article
50 of the law declares that "the ordinances promulgated by virtue of
Article 2 of [the April 1962 Referendum] have and continue to have the
force of law from the date of their publication."
252
In general it would seem that the Conseil's control over executive
law-making can only be effective in cases involving the Government
(article 37 decrees and article 38 ordinances). The President's relative
immunity from control is the logical consequence of his new importance.
The Fifth Republic is different from the parliamentary democracies
which preceded it, and the man, whom article 5 declares to be "the
guarantor of national independence, the integrity of the territory, and
the respect of Community Agreements and of treaties" can hardly be
viewed as a mere administrative official. (One might also say this of a
Government which "determines and conducts the policy of the Nation.")
In any event, presidential law-making is likely to remain the exception
rather than the rule.
In conclusion it is not the intent of this article to suggest that France
245 See text at note 252 infra.
246 Le Monde, March 15, 1963, p. 4, col. 6.
247 Silvera, La rforme du Conseil d'Etat, [1963] S. Chron. 51, 59.
248 Ibid.
249 E.g., Duverger, Conseil d'Etat ou Conseil du Roi? Le Monde, June 6, 1963,
p. 1, col. 3.
250 Drago, Some Recent Reforms of the French Conseil d'Etat, 13 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 1262, 1284 (1964).
251 See text at note 225 supra.
252 Law Number 62-23, Jan. 15, 1963, Journal Officiel, Jan. 16, 1963, p. 508.
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in on the verge of enthusiastically embracing judicial review of legisla-
tion. Nonetheless, the traditional picture of monolithic hostility needs to
be modified. Influential jurists are arguing for the institution of judicial
review.2 53 Perhaps also its existence in neighboring countries will have
some effect.25 4 In view of the lowering of Parliament's status, many of
the old arguments against judicial review have lost their force.255 Most
important is the example of the Conseil d'Etat, an example which pro-
ponents of judicial review have invoked in the past.2 50 In its case law
developing the recours pour exc~s de pouvoir the Conseil has shown the
importance of an impartial judiciary as a bulwark against governmental
excesses. And to the extent that the executive makes "law," the Conseil
has engaged in judicial review of that law. Indeed, this control may
assume greater importance in view of the Fifth Republic's extension of
executive law-making in article 37.257 It is true that the Conseil's use
of this power has been restrained, and the measures annulled have gener-
ally been of secondary importance. Nonetheless, it may well be that the
existence of this power and its general acceptance constitutes an impor-
tant first step on the road to judicial review.
253 Professor Duverger, for example, is a member of this group.
254 For a general survey, see Cappelletti & Adams.
255 Duverger, op. cit. supra note 200, at 172-73.
256 See Constitutional Committee of the Second Constituent Assembly, session
of July 11, 1946, remarks of M. Bardoux, translated in von Mehren 161.
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